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Abstract
This paper provides empirical support for one theory of transition delays: initial land
inequality. Using a new historical data set for land inequality (Frankema (2009)) we employ
duration analysis to investigate whether higher levels of land inequality lead to longer delays
in the extension of primary schooling. Our findings suggest that land inequality is a key
determinant of delays in schooling.
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1 Introduction
The transition from economic stagnation to growth and the associated phenomenon of the
great divergence has been the subject of intensive research in the growth literature. In
particular, there has been a large body of work that is concerned with the issue of economic
take-offs. This work describes the transition of economies from a state of economic stagnation
to a modern industrial economy with positive growth rates. Notable examples include Galor
and Weil (2000), Hansen and Prescott (2001), and Desmet and Parente (2009).
Recent work in the growth literature has focused on the effect of fundamental theories
(associated with slow moving determinants) such as geography and institutions on variations
in long-run economic performance across countries. In this paper, we are interested in
whether these fundamental determinants are also important explanations for delays in
countries achieving economic take-offs. Specifically, we focus on the empirical support for
one theory of transition delays - initial land inequality.
Many researchers have highlighted the role that initial land inequality plays in terms of
delaying the onset of economic take-off. In particular, the theory has highlighted the deep
connection between land inequality and human capital accumulation. In Galor, Moav, and
Vollrath (2009), henceforth GMV, land inequality negatively affects the implementation of
educational reforms that lead to the extension of educational opportunities to the general
population.1 In particular, due to the low complementarity of human capital and land (see
also, Galor and Moav (2006)), an increase in the level of human capital increases productivity
in industry more than the agricultural sector, causing a decrease in the returns to land and
a rise in wages. Consequently, political elites who initially derive most of their income
from land have no incentive to support educational reforms. However, since productivity
growth in the industrial sector outstrips that in the agricultural sector, the returns from
the capital holdings of political elites increase as a proportion of their total income as the
economy advances. Their objection to education reform therefore declines over time such
that a critical time is reached whereby human capital-enhancing policies (e.g., compulsory
schooling) are enacted.
While GMV posit a direct effect of land inequality on transition delays, other work in the
1Several other works have also documented the relationship between land inequality and the lower 
provision of other forms of public goods (including financial development), such as Banerjee and Iyer (2005) 
and Rajan and Ramcharan (2010).
1
literature also propose an indirect effect whereby land inequality influences the evolution of
political institutions, and it is these institutions that then determine the delays in transition.
Parente and Prescott (2000), Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2006), and Engerman
and Sokoloff (2002) have all pointed out the important role that land inequality plays in
determining the evolution of political institutions. The difference between these works and
that of GMV is the emphasis on an independent role for political institutions and their
persistence in determining delays in enacting human capital promoting initiatives. For
example, as Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2006) point out, if there are rents to staying
in power, then, the politically powerful landed aristocracy would have a strong incentive to
block the introduction of new technologies and institutions in order to protect their power
and profits, delaying at the same time the industrialization process. The suggestion here
is that the autonomous nature of political institutions may require direct reforms to these
institutions in order for welfare enhancing outcomes to be achieved. In contrast, in GMV’s
framework, economic progress automatically leads to a shift in incentives faced by the elites,
and to their willingness to adopt human capital enhancing policies.
Our contribution in this paper is twofold. First, we ask the question of what factors
determine the delay of a country in achieving a particular education penetration rate (e.g.
50% primary schooling enrollment). Specifically, do higher levels of land inequality lead to
longer delays? We exploit a new historical data set for land inequality by Frankema (2009)
to investigate this question in the context of hazard rate models. This is a departure from
the standard empirical work that is carried out in the growth literature. Methodologically,
empirical work in the growth literature focuses on the effects of various covariates on long-run
per capita income or growth. In this paper, we focus instead on a more direct prediction of
the theory - what are the effects of various fundamental determinants on delay in schooling?
Second, we explicitly address the issue of model uncertainty in investigating how
fundamental determinants, such as land inequality, affect the extension of schooling
opportunities. As Brock and Durlauf (2001) and others have argued, a characteristic of
the new growth theories is their inherent open-endedness. In our context, for example, the
hypothesis that land inequality is a determinant of schooling delays does not automatically
preclude an alternative theory, such as institutions, from also being a possible explanation.
The inherent open-endedness of new growth theories presents unique challenges to researchers
in exploring their quantitative consequences on growth. Because the inclusion of one set of
growth theories says nothing about whether other possible growth theories should be included
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(or not) in the model, growth researchers face substantial model uncertainty in their work.
The fear is that the inclusion or exclusion of growth variables may significantly alter the
conclusions one had previously arrived at for, say, the effect of land inequality on delays in
schooling based on a particular model in the model space.
One approach taken by the literature has been to move away from drawing inferences
that are contingent on a particular model. Instead, researchers first determine a space of
plausible models and then present inference conditional on the model space. Hence, our
analysis does not assume that the GMV theory is necessarily the true one but rather it
provides findings that are robust to alternative theories and their proxies. More precisely,
we employ a Bayesian model averaging technique that aggregates the findings across different
plausible model specifications using the posterior evidence as weights for each model; see for
example Durlauf, Kourtellos, and Tan (2008).
Our findings are consistent with the theory proposed by GMV. We find that increased
levels of land inequality lead to more delays in the extension of schooling opportunities to
the general population. This result is robust to variations in the specification of the hazard
model, and holds true for a range of primary schooling penetration rates as well as for
the dates when compulsory schooling were legally introduced across the set of countries.
Interestingly, initial values of political institutions (as measured by an executive constraint
variable) do not appear to be important in determining delays in schooling.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the econometric methodology,
discusses our data, and presents the results for the hazard analysis. Section 3 provides a
robustness analysis and Section 4 concludes and discusses future work.
2 Delay in Schooling
2.1 Implementation
In this paper, we are interested in the probability of the event that a country moves from
a low education state to a high education state, which we define as a take-off. In GMV’s
theory, these two states correspond to a state of economic stagnation and a state of sustained
economic growth, respectively.
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Assume that countries i = 1, ..., n enter the low education state at time zero and each
country experiences a single spell in this state. Let the delay in schooling be the duration of
this spell denoted by the random variable Ti and let its realization be denoted by ti, which
takes a value in {1, 2, ..., t̄}, where t̄ is the maximum value of the delay in the data. Denote the
cumulative distribution and probability density functions of Ti conditional on a p×1 vector of
time-invariant country-specific characteristics/regressors, Xi, by FTi|Xi(ti) = P (Ti ≤ ti|Xi)
and fTi|Xi(ti), respectively. Conditional on Xi the survival function of Ti is defined as
STi|Xi(ti) = 1 − FTi|Xi(ti), which gives the probability that a take-off has not occurred by
duration ti.
We focus on the rate at which a country leaves the state at duration ti given that it
has not done so yet. Specifically, conditional on Xi, the probability that the spell of low
education is completed at ti given it has not been completed before ti is defined by the hazard
function




The value of the hazard function for specific ti is called the hazard rate. The hazard rate
is a measure of risk in the sense that higher hazard rates correspond to higher risks of
transitioning out of the low education/stagnation state therefore implying shorter delays in
the extension of schooling opportunities.
For a country with regressors Xi, a particular parametric specification for the hazard




where ψ0(ti) is the time dependent part known as the baseline hazard function that describes
the countries’ risk for transitioning if their risk was independent of their characteristics. This
specification allows only the level of the hazard function to differ across countries. The term
exp(X ′iθ) is called the “systematic part” of the hazard. This particular specification of the
hazard regression is known as the static Cox proportional hazard (Cox-PH) model; Cox
(1972). θ is the p × 1 vector of parameters in the Cox-PH model estimated by partial
likelihood. The Cox-PH model is a semi-parametric model in the sense that while it makes
no assumption about the form of the function ψ0(ti), it assumes a parametric form for the
effect of the predictors on the hazard.2
2For robustness purposes we also investigated alternative parametric hazard models such as the
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2.2 Data
In terms of the data, we construct a cross-sectional dataset based on historical data spanning
from 1700 to 1998 for a sample of 53 countries. A detailed description of the data and our
sources is given in the Data Appendix A1. Table 1 lists the countries in our sample.
The delay in schooling, Ti, is measured in two ways. The first measure is the time it
takes for each country to first reach a penetration rate in primary schooling enrollment,
minus the time it took the first country to pass that critical value. For example, the United
States was the first country to pass the 50% primary school enrollment penetration rate in
1831. Therefore, tUS is normalized at 1. In contrast, by the end of the span of the dataset,
Mozambique had not achieved that penetration rate yet; hence, t̄ equals 164. The reason
for constructing the delay variable as a measure that relates primary schooling enrollment
in one country relative to the first country to pass the penetration rate is so as to overcome
the left censoring problem. Since all other countries achieve the penetration rate at later
dates than the first country to do so, left censoring is eliminated. The penetration rates we
consider have to fulfill two conditions: (i) they have to be high enough to capture the GMV
idea of a large scale extension of public schooling opportunities to the population, and (ii)
they have to be low enough so that enough countries attain the level within the sample so
that we do not have too many instances of right censoring in the data.
The actual construction of the primary schooling data follows Comin and Hobijn (2004)
who construct historical primary schooling data for 23 industrialized countries, measured as
the number of students in primary school as a fraction of the population, in the age range 5-
14. We extend the primary schooling data set to a larger set of 53 countries for this analysis.
The number of students enrolled is taken from Banks (1999), while the population in the
age range 5-14 is taken from Mitchell (1998).
The above delay in primary schooling measure is ideal because it directly measures
actual penetration rates that were historically achieved. As a robustness check, however, we
consider a second measure, which is the delay in introducing a compulsory primary schooling
law. Similar to the delay in primary schooling measure, the delay in compulsory primary
schooling is defined as the time it takes for each country to introduce compulsory schooling
compared to the first country to introduce compulsory schooling. In this case we only have a
sample of 50 countries for which the first country was Austria in 1774 while the US (ranked
Exponential, Log Logistic, and Weibull without finding substantial differences.
5
4th) only passed compulsory primary schooling legislation in 1852. The countries with the
longest delays in legislating compulsory primary schooling include Guatemala, Kenya, and
Pakistan, all of which had yet to do so by the end of the sample period.
We now discuss the set of explanatory variables, Xi. For our analysis to correspond
closely with the theory, we imagine that countries always existed, but have different
structural characteristics and historical experiences that influence when they achieve a
particular penetration rate in schooling. These factors then explain why a particular country
experienced a delay in schooling attainment vis-à-vis the US experience. We think of these
factors as controlling for two kinds of country-specific heterogeneity.
The first type of country-specific heterogeneity corresponds to factors that are invariant
to the particular political elites that are in power at the time when schooling policy decisions
are made. These factors largely correspond to country-specific fixed effects as well as the
time it took for the relevant political elites; that is, the political elites who would make policy
decisions about schooling and who would see these through, to come to power.
One reason why a country might have experienced a delay in schooling attainment vis-
à-vis the US may be because of its colonial history. We do have information about whether
a country was historically a European colony. To the extent that we can think of the initial
conditions of a colony as being substantially influenced by the European metropolis, we can
control for country-specific heterogeneity by including colonial dummy variables (specifically,
whether a country was a British colony, a Spanish or Portuguese colony, a French colony, or
Other European colony).
Another reason why a country may take more time than the US to attain a particular
schooling penetration rate may be that the relevant elites took longer to attain power
and therefore control over schooling policies. To control for the variation in the time it
took a country’s elites to attain autonomy over policies relative to the US, we include an
Independence variable that measures the additional years it took for each country to declare
independence relative to the US, who declared independence in 1776. This variable takes
the value zero for metropolis countries, and positive integers for colonies.
We also control for the elites’ hold on power by including a measure of Political Instability
due to Miller (2011). The idea is that elites who cannot secure their hold on power may have
less ability to influence policy outcomes (or, alternatively, face different incentives in enacting
particular policies) hence leading to variation in delays in achieving particular schooling
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penetration rates. Political Instability is measured as the average of the first differences (in
absolute values) of the Polity2 variable from Polity IV. The Polity2 variable is a measure of
the degree of democracy in a country with a score of +10 representing most democratic and
-10 signifying most autocratic. The averages of the first differences are calculated as follows:
for colonies we average values of the (absolute) year-to-year changes in the Polity2 variable
from the year of independence to the year the colony achieves the schooling penetration rate,
while for non-colonies, we take the corresponding average values from the earliest available
observation until the year the country achieves the schooling penetration rate.
The second set of variables corresponds to factors that influence the incentives of political
elites to extend primary schooling opportunities to the population according to the theory.
As detailed in the Introduction, our main aim is to investigate how land inequality affects
the transition from economic stagnation to the sustained growth era, through the human
capital channel. To do so, we use land inequality data from Frankema (2009). The variable
is expressed in Gini coefficients, and it is compiled on the basis of the decile distribution of
the total number of land holdings (farms), and the total amount of agricultural land (nation-
wide), excluding communal pastures and forests.3 Here, a holding refers to “all agricultural
land assigned to a “holder” that is one or two persons, but no group, community or state,
or to a distinct “management unit”, i.e. a farm. The total agricultural area includes all
land that is part of a holding, i.e. arable land, land under permanent crops, land under
permanent meadows and pastures, wood and forest land and a category of all other land. In
the case of shifting cultivation the total area of the holding consists of the total area under
crops and the area that is prepared for cultivation [Frankema, 2006, p. 3]”. The primary
data sources that Frankema uses to calculate the land distribution data comes from the IIA
and FAO World Census of Agriculture. For our analysis, we use the earliest available land
Gini observation for each country.
One concern with using land Gini as a variable is that it may be proxying for other
forms of wealth or income inequality. Some forms of wealth inequality may in fact imply
dramatically different theoretical outcomes from those of GMV. For example, if inequality
was a result of inequality in capital holdings and not of land holdings by elites, it may
be the case that elites would prefer higher levels of schooling for the population since
human capital is complementary to physical capital. However, if we fail to include a proxy




j=1 |zi − zj| / 2n
2µ, where zi and zj are the
percentage shares of land of n deciles (n = 10) and µ = 1/n.
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variable for capital holdings inequality then the estimates for the effects of land inequality on
schooling outcomes are likely to be biased. Alternatively, the precise nature of the inequality
responsible for lower schooling levels may be misspecified. For example, land Gini may be
proxying for income inequality (instead of land inequality) which has also been shown to be
associated with poor education outcomes across countries. In fact, Goldin and Katz (1997)
find evidence that supports this proposition for the case of the US. To safeguard against
these possibilities, we consider a new dataset of global inequality (BFLZ Gini Index) that
has recently been introduced by Van Zanden, Baten, Földvari, and Van Leeuwen (2011).
This new dataset is available for a large set of countries spanning from 1820 to 1995 and
improves the Bourguignon and Morrisson (2002) dataset in several ways. In particular, it is
calculated using a much larger number of observations of within country inequality and it is
based on the new 2005 PPPs of the World Bank’s ICP project, which gives a more accurate
picture of disparities in GDP per capita than the previous ICP rounds.4
GMV also theorize that land abundance that would benefit agriculture in the early
stages of development would lead the landowning elite to be more reluctant to enact human
capital enhancing policies that disproportionately benefit capitalists and workers. We include
therefore a measure of land abundance, the log of arable land (absolute) in hectares, in 1700,
and investigate whether more land abundance leads to greater delays in schooling. We also
control for total land and total population by including the log of total land in hectares and
the log of total population in 1700.
GMV’s theory also requires that we control for other developmental differences between
countries. The reason is that for a given level of land inequality, all else equal, higher levels
of economic development corresponds to capital holdings constituting a larger proportion of
the asset portfolio of elites. Since elites in more developed economies would derive a higher
portion of their income from the industrial sector, they would be more willing to enact human
capital-friendly policies. We control for initial development differences between countries
using the log of GDP per capita (Initial Income; Maddison (2009)). For non-colonies, we
take the average of log GDP per capita values from the earliest possible data point until
1831, while for colonies, we use the data on independence day or, if this is unavailable, the
earliest data point after independence. We should note that in all cases, the income data
occurs prior to the country achieving the schooling penetration rate. The timing of the
4We are very grateful to Bas van Leeuwen for very kindly sharing the global inequality data from
Van Zanden, Baten, Földvari, and Van Leeuwen (2011) with us.
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variable is meant to capture the level of development that was relevant to the elites that are
in power at the time when schooling policies are enacted.
The main alternative theory for schooling delays, as noted in the Introduction, is political
institutions. We proxy initial political institutions using historical executive constraints data
from Polity IV (Initial Executive Constraints). This variable lies between zero and one, with
higher values indicating more constraints on the power of the executive. Similar to the Initial
Income variable above, we take the average of executive constraints values from the earliest
possible data point until 1831 for non-colonies and use the data on independence day or, if
unavailable, the earliest data point after independence for colonies. In all cases, the data for
executive constraints occurs prior to the country achieving the schooling penetration rate,
and is meant to capture the relevant degree of executive constraints that apply to elites
empowered to determine schooling outcomes.
Following the empirical growth literature, we also control for a set of new growth theories
that have potential implications for human capital accumulation. The first such theory
argues that a detrimental climate may have negative effects on human capital accumulation
(see, Sachs, Gallup, and Mellinger (1999)). We proxy climate using a variable (Tropics) which
measures the percentage of a country’s land area that is classified as tropical or subtropical.
Finally, another theory requires that we account for the effects of ethnic heterogeneity on
delays in schooling. Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly (1999) suggest that higher levels of ethnic
heterogeneity potentially result in political disagreements over the provision of public goods
(such as schooling), and its subsequent under-provision. To control for the effect of ethnic
heterogeneity on delays in schooling, we include a measure of ethnic fractionalization due to
Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat, and Wacziarg (2003) in Xi.
Table 2 presents summary statistics while Table A1 of the Appendix provides a detailed
descriptions of all the variables.
2.3 Model averaging of hazard models
Standard duration analysis estimates a baseline PH-Cox model in equation (2.2), which is
closest to the theory in question and then reports a few robustness exercises that include some
additional controls. An alternative approach to evaluate the relative evidentiary support of
competing theories includes a large number of variables and those variables that prove to be
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significant are then rendered as the important determinants. This approach is often referred
to as a ‘kitchen sink’ approach.
However, both approaches ignore the issue of model uncertainty that arises because of
theory open-endedness (as described in the Introduction). Both approaches above essentially
present inference that is contingent on a single benchmark model. The evidence therefore
relies on strong priors on the part of the econometrician regarding the correct specification
of the benchmark model. How can we obtain robust conclusions about the effect of land
inequality in equation (2.2) and more generally about the structural parameters θ that do
not condition on the model choice?
To systematically address the issue of model uncertainty, we employ a Bayesian Model
Averaging (BMA) approach by constructing estimates conditional not on a single model,
but on a model space whose elements span an appropriate range of determinants suggested
by a large body of work. In the context of this paper, we consider two specifications for
the model space, denoted by M = {M1, ..,MK}. In the first specification, we are totally
agnostic about whether any of the particular growth regressors described in Section 2.2 are
in the true model, and therefore assign each regressor a 0.5 prior probability of being in
the true model. The model space M, in this case, is composed of the set of all possible
permutations of the above growth regressors. This first specification, therefore, deals very
generally with the issue of model uncertainty and is consistent with approaches taken in the
growth literature such as Fernandez, Ley, and Steel (2001) and Sala-i Martin, Doppelhofer,
and Miller (2004). For robustness, we also consider a second specification where either (i)
land inequality (Land gini) or (ii) the set of variables associated with GMV’s theory (Land
gini, Initial Income, Arable Land, Total Land, and Total Population) are included in every
model in the model space.5 This second specification addresses a narrower form of model
uncertainty and is consistent with the approach of Levine and Renelt (1992). The aim, in
this case, is to specifically test the maintained GMV hypothesis that land inequality affects
schooling delays while treating the other growth regressors as purely nuisance variables.
A number of recent papers have documented the advantages of using BMA in
constructing robust estimates primarily in the context of the linear model.6 Our BMA
approach is closest to Volinsky, Madigan, Raftery, and Kronmal (1997) who employ BMA
5We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion.
6See for example, Brock and Durlauf (2001), Fernandez, Ley, and Steel (2001), Sala-i Martin, Doppelhofer,
and Miller (2004), Durlauf, Kourtellos, and Tan (2008), and Masanjala and Papageorgiou (2008).
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in the context of Cox-PH models to study the risk factors for stroke. Model averaging
“integrates out” the uncertainty over models by taking the weighted average of model-specific
estimates, where the weights reflect the evidentiary support for each model given the data,
D, and which are constructed to be analogous to posterior model probabilities. Then the





where µ̂(θ|Mk, D) is the empirical posterior distribution of θ given a particular model Mk,
and µ̂(Mk|D) is the empirical posterior probability of model Mk, which is an element of
the model space M. The former is a standard Bayesian object, which does not have
a closed form expressions in the case of Cox-PH models. Following Volinsky, Madigan,
Raftery, and Kronmal (1997) we use the maximum likelihood approximation µ̂(θ|Mk, D) ≈
µ̂(θ|Mk, θ̂D,k, D), where θ̂D,k is the partial likelihood estimator of the model parameter θk for
a particular model Mk.
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As for the model weights, µ̂(Mk|D) we use the Bayes’ rule, so that each weight is the
product of the integrated likelihood of the data given a model, µ̂(D|Mk), and the prior
probability for a model, µ(Mk):
µ̂(Mk|D) ∝ µ̂(D|Mk)µ(Mk). (2.4)
As standard in the literature, we assume a uniform model prior so that the prior
probability that any variable is included in the true model is taken to be 0.5. The
integrated likelihood of model Mk is approximated by the Bayesian information criterion
(BIC), log µ̂(D|Mk) = log µ̂(D|θ̂D,k,Mk)− (p/2) logn + O(1), where n is the total number of
uncensored cases. The BIC approximation to the integrated likelihood implicitly defines that
the parameter prior is the unit information prior, which can be viewed as a special case of the
Zellner’s (fixed) g-prior that contains information approximately equal to that contained in
a single observation; see Kass and Wasserman (1995) and Raftery (1995). Our choice of the
priors follows Eicher, Papageorgiou, and Raftery (2011) who found that the unit information
prior combined with a uniform prior over the model space generally outperformed competing
7This posterior refers to the following integral µ(θ|Mk, D) =
∫
µ(θ|θk,Mk, D)µ(θk|Mk, D)dθk, where
µ(θ|θk,Mk, D) is the likelihood and µ(θk|Mk, D)dθk is the prior density of θk.
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priors.





The notation θ̂D,M emphasizes the dependence of the estimator on data D and model space
M instead of individual model Mk. We also compute the corresponding model averaging









where V̂ θD,k is the model-specific posterior variance of the partial likelihood estimator. The
first term in equation (2.6) is the average of the posterior variances within models and the
second term is the variance of the posterior means across models (i.e. weighted average of
the squared deviations of the model-specific from the model averaged estimates).8
Following the literature one can conduct inference on each covariate’s effect θj on the
delay of schooling in the context of BMA in a number of ways. A standard approach uses
the posterior probability of inclusion (PIP) for each covariate. More precisely, this is the
posterior probability that a regression coefficient for a variable is nonzero (posterior effect
probability) and is computed as the sum of posterior probabilities of the models which
contain that variable:
P(θj 6= 0|D) =
∑
k∈{s: θj 6=0 in Ms}
P(Mk|D) (2.7)
The larger the probability of the nonzero effect, the larger the evidence in favor of the
covariate j being part of the true theory.9
An alternative way to conduct inference is to view equations (2.5) and (2.6) above as a
8Following Volinsky, Madigan, Raftery, and Kronmal (1997) we employ the “leaps and bounds algorithm”
to choose top K models.
9Eicher, Henn, and Papageorgiou (2012) following Kass and Raftery (1995) proposed a classification
rule to sort the posterior inclusion probability into a categorical measure of the strength of evidence of
the covariate’s effect: PIP< 50% indicates lack of evidence for an effect; 50% <PIP< 75% indicates weak
evidence for an effect; 75% <PIP< 95% indicates positive evidence for an effect; 95% <PIP< 99% indicates
strong evidence for an effect; 99% <PIP< 100% indicates decisive evidence for an effect.
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“hybrid” approach to model averaging in the sense that frequentist probability statements
about observables given unobservables are mixed with Bayesian probability statement about
unobservables given observables. Sala-i Martin, Doppelhofer, and Miller (2004) proposed
this approach in the context of growth regressions and argued that the weighting scheme
for their “hybrid” model average estimator can be derived as a limiting case of a standard
Bayesian analysis as the prior information becomes dominated by the data. For a similar
approach, see Durlauf, Kourtellos, and Tan (2011). Papers that interpret equations (2.5)
and (2.6) in this way typically report BMA posterior t-statistics for coefficient estimates and
interpret them in the classical sense.
However, inference based on a BMA posterior t-statistic must be interpreted with caution
because its asymptotic distribution is a mixture of Normal distributions, which is often
characterized by irregular shapes, far away from Normal, and thereby rendering inference
based on classical interpretations invalid. In the Appendix, Figures A1 and A2 present the
BMA posterior probability distributions for the coefficients of the covariates for the hazard
models using the delay in primary and compulsory schooling, respectively. These figures
also show the posterior probability that each coefficient is zero by a solid line at zero, with
height equal to the probability. The nonzero part of the distribution is scaled so that the
maximum height is equal to the probability that the coefficient is nonzero.
In the discussion of our findings below, we focus on PIPs for covariates but we also
report the corresponding posterior t-statistics and interpret them in the classical (“hybrid”)
sense subject to the aforementioned caveats.10
2.4 Hazard results for delay in schooling
We present our benchmark findings for the Cox PH model in equation (2.2) in Table 4.
The dependent variable, delay in schooling, is the time it takes for each country to first
reach a particular penetration rate in primary schooling enrollment, minus the time the first
country (the US, in this case) passed that level. For the penetration rate to be consistent
with the GMV idea of a substantial extension of schooling opportunities to the population,
we considered penetration rates ranging from 30% to 65%.
10Raftery (1995) provides some guidance on how to interpret posterior t-statistics given various sample
sizes. In our context, Raftery suggests that a t-statistic greater than 2.43 would correspond to a “positive”
statement in support of rejecting the null hypothesis while a t-statistic greater than 3.15 would constitute
“strong” evidence for doing so.
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When the penetration rate is low (essentially for all penetration rates below 45%), almost
all countries successfully attain the penetration rate with very little difference in the time it
took to do so, so that there is not enough variation in the data to properly identify the effects
of land inequality on schooling delays. However, when the penetration rate is high (above
55%), the number of right censored countries becomes large. Table 3 shows the countries
that failed to reach various primary schooling enrollment penetration rates; i.e., countries
that are right censored. Right censoring reduces the observed variation in schooling delays,
and makes it difficult to identify the effects of land inequality on delays.
For conciseness, we only report full results for the 50% penetration rate in Table 4. The
results for land gini as well as the other covariates for penetration rates between about 40%
and 50% do not differ substantively. This can be seen from Figure 1, which shows the PIPs
for the land gini variable as a function of penetration rates in primary schooling enrollment.
Full results for all other covariates are available upon request.
The first three columns of Table 4 present the results from our model averaging analysis.
Here, we employ the more general specification for model uncertainty (as discussed in Section
2.2) and assume that each regressor has a 0.5 prior probability of being in the true model.
In the next subsection, we consider the case when the GMV variables are always included
in all models. The first column shows the posterior probability that each of the covariates is
included in the true model for the hazard rate, while the second and third columns present the
BMA posterior means and standard errors for each covariate. The remaining four columns
show, respectively, the coefficient estimate and standard error for each covariate for the
posterior mode model from the BMA analysis, and the largest model in the model space
considered in the BMA analysis.
Our reason for reporting the results from the posterior mode and largest model is to
provide the reader with the ability to compare findings via model selection - using the best
model (in terms of posterior weights) or a low-bias model (at the cost of reduced efficiency)
with potentially many irrelevant covariates - with those obtained via model averaging (BMA).
Finally, we also note that the posterior means are interpreted as the marginal effect of each
covariate on the risk of crossing the 50% primary schooling penetration rate. Therefore,
positive estimates imply that the marginal contribution of the corresponding covariate is to
reduce the delay in schooling for countries.
Our BMA results are consistent with the theoretical predictions of GMV. As GMV
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argued, for given levels of economic progress, land inequality implies a higher reliance of
political elites on income derived from landholdings leading them to delay the implementation
of human capital enhancing policies, which primarily benefit capitalists and workers.
Similarly, the greater the abundance of arable land, all else equal, the greater the importance
of agriculture in the elites’ portfolio, the higher their subsequent reliance on returns from
landholdings, and the greater their reluctance to expand schooling opportunities. However,
for given levels of land inequality and arable land, economic progress results in a rebalancing
of the portfolio returns of landholding elites away from income derived from land holdings
to returns from capital holdings resulting in elites being more willing to extend schooling to
the population.
Consistent with the theory, we find that higher levels of land inequality (higher values
for Land Gini), greater abundance of Arable Land, and lower Initial Income result in lower
risks of exceeding the 50% schooling penetration rate, thereby implying greater delays in the
expansion of schooling opportunities. More precisely, the posterior inclusion probabilities
of Land Gini, Arable Land, and Initial Income are all very high at 99%, 90.7%, and 98%,
respectively - well above the 50% prior inclusion probability. The corresponding posterior
means for all three variables are also strongly significant at the 1% level for Initial Income
and Land Gini and at the 5% level for Arable Land. In particular, a 1% decrease in land gini
yields approximately a 6.5% increase in the relative hazard risk of taking off from stagnation.
The BMA findings are confirmed by the results from the posterior mode model and the largest
model. Interestingly, the posterior mode model includes all the model averaging covariates
with statistically significant posterior mean. Note, however, the posterior model probability
for the mode model is 0.165, whereas the largest model has posterior model probability of
0.000 suggesting that the latter is a rather poor model choice.
Table 4 also makes clear that it is inequality in land ownership specifically, and not
other (non-land) forms of inequality (as proxied for by BFLZ Gini Index) that is important
in determining schooling delays. The posterior inclusion probability for BFLZ Gini Index is
at 10.1% whereas the posterior mean is not significant. Noticeable is also the fact that the
variable is not included in the posterior mode model.
Two sets of factors that can be interpreted as country fixed effects are shown to be
strongly significant. The first is the delay in a country gaining independence relative to
the US. We find, predictably, that countries that took more time to gain independence, so
that the relevant elites required more time to attain autonomous control over policies, also
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faced longer delays in achieving an extension of schooling opportunities to the population,
all else equal. The posterior inclusion probability of the Independence variable is 100% and
significant at the 1% level.
Along with gaining autonomy over a country’s policies, the level of Political Instability
(elites’ hold over power) is also important (with posterior inclusion probability of 100%)
and highly significant at the 1% level. Our BMA findings (consistent with those of the
other reported models) indicate that a greater degree of Political Instability, all else equal,
leads to longer delays in reaching the 50% schooling penetration rate. An interesting related
finding is that there is no evidence that initial institutions (as measured by Initial Executive
Constraints) affects schooling delays. The posterior inclusion probability for Initial Executive
Constraints is well below 50% at 12.9%, and the posterior mean is not significant. Initial
Executive Constraints also does not appear in the posterior mode model. One reason for
this negative finding may be that Political Instability is already a de facto constraint on
executive power, and therefore the effect of institutions on schooling delays flows through
this channel.
Furthermore, being either a British colony or some other colony that is not French,
Spanish, or Portuguese results in a shorter delay in achieving schooling take-off. The
posterior inclusion probabilities for the British colony and Other colony dummies are both
very high at 96.2% and 100%, respectively, and the corresponding coefficient estimates are
strongly significant. None of the other growth theories appear to be either significant or
important (in terms of posterior inclusion probabilities) explanations for delays in achieving
the schooling penetration rate.
As a final note, a careful look into the individual posterior model probabilities suggests
that the posterior mode model is not a dominant model but rather the posterior mass is
spread evenly, and over larger models, resulting in a high share of important covariates. For
example, beyond the posterior mode, the next best four models carry probabilities 0.150,
0.057, 0.049, and 0.036. Figures A3 and A4 in the Appendix show the cumulative posterior
probabilities of the top 25 models. This evidence provides some reassurance that the results
do not suffer from the supermodel effect behavior, which refers to the spurious concentration
of posterior mass on a single or a few models. In particular, the concern is that the fixed
prior structure (Zellners g-prior) may exert non-negligible influence on the posterior model
probabilities and hence on inference; see for example Feldkircher and Zeugner (2009).11
11To overcome this problem some authors proposed, in the context of the linear regression, the use of flexible
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In sum, our findings appear to provide strong support for the hypothesis that schooling
delays are entirely explained by variables suggested by GMV’s theory. More precisely, we find
that higher levels of land inequality lead to longer delays in the introduction of a compulsory
primary schooling law.
3 Robustness
We provide two complementary sets of robustness exercises. First, we consider an alternative
measure for schooling delays. Instead of using the 50% penetration rate in primary schooling
enrollment as a measure of schooling delays, we now estimate a hazard model for delays in
the introduction of a compulsory primary schooling law. The dependent variable here is
the time it takes for each country to introduce compulsory schooling compared to the first
country to introduce compulsory schooling. According to Table 5, and consistently with the
theory and the earlier findings, higher levels of land inequality results in increased delays in
introducing a compulsory schooling law. More precisely, the posterior inclusion probability
of Land Gini is again very high at 90.6% - well above the 50% prior inclusion probability.
The corresponding posterior mean is also negative and significant at the 5% level. The BMA
results are also confirmed by the results from the posterior mode model.
Second, as discussed in Section 2.3, we present results for a more restrictive model
averaging exercise. Table 6 shows the various cases where we include either Land gini or
the entire set of GMV variables in every model in the model space. We then treat the other
regressors as nuisance variables and allow them to vary across models. We report results
for both our main dependent variable; i.e., the time it took to achieve the 50% penetration
rate in primary schooling enrollment, as well as the delay in the introduction of compulsory
primary schooling variable as described above. As with the previous robustness exercise,
we find that our results confirm the benchmark findings in Section 2.4. In all cases, the
coefficient to Land gini is negative and highly significant at the 1% level. The magnitude of
the partial effect is also slightly larger in this case.
prior structures, a hyper-g prior whose data-dependent shrinkage adapts posterior model distributions to
data quality, but the evidence appears to be mixed or preliminary. For example, Liang, Paulo, Molina, Clyde,
and Berger (2008) were not able to find strong evidence to demonstrate that the hyper-g prior is better than
the fixed g-prior. In contrast, in a complementary paper, Feldkircher and Zeugner (2009) demonstrate that
the use of hyper-g prior distributes the posterior mass more evenly than fixed g-priors.
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We conclude therefore that our benchmark findings are robust to alternative
specifications for schooling delays. They are also consistent with the results from a narrower
test of the GMV hypothesis that maintains the GMV variables in the regression equation
while accounting for model uncertainty induced by the presence of auxiliary growth theories.
4 Conclusion and Discussion
In this paper, we empirically investigate the direct predictions of the theory of Galor, Moav,
and Vollrath (2009) that higher levels of land inequality result in delays in the implementation
of human capital enhancing policies. Using new historical data by Frankema (2009), we test
the importance of land inequality as a determinant of delays in the extension of schooling
opportunities against alternatives theories. Using BMA analysis in hazard models, we find
that higher levels of land inequality result in delays in countries reaching particular schooling
penetration rates. Moreover, the BMA analysis provides a useful way to account for model
uncertainty by summarizing evidence from all possible models rather than focusing on a
single model.
In future work, we plan to extent the analysis in this paper to investigate the effects of
schooling delays on long-run economic growth. An empirically testable long-run implication
of GMV that is also generally related to the Unified Growth Theory (UGT); see, Galor and
Weil (1999, 2000), Galor and Moav (2002), and Galor (2005), is that the differential timing
of take-offs from stagnation to growth ultimately segments economies into convergence clubs.
We therefore plan to investigate whether observed values for historical schooling delays may
be responsible for segmenting countries into multiple growth regimes.
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Table 1: List of Countries
This table presents the list of countries. In the bracket we note the date of the actual starting date of each
country.
Europe Latin America Middle East and North Africa
Austria (1919) Argentina (1895) Algeria (1962)
Belgium (1860) Brazil (1872) Egypt (1951)
Denmark (1882) Chile (1895) Iran (1887)
France (1851) Colombia (1938) Iraq (1957)
Greece (1870) Costa Rica (1883) Morocco (1956)
Ireland (1926) Dom. Rep (1844) Tunisia (1956)
Netherlands (1899) Ecuador (1950)
Norway (1855) El Salvador (1930) South Asia
Portugal (1864) Guatemala (1950) India (1947)
Romania (1899) Honduras (1930) Pakistan (1961)
Sweden (1882) Nicaragua (1950) Sri Lanka (1948)
UK (1860) Panama (1950)
Paraguay (1950) Central Asia
Offshoots Peru (1961) Turkey (1935)
Australia (1946)
Canada (1865) East Asia and Pacific
N. Zealand (1907) China (1953)
USA (1830) Indonesia (1961)
Japan (1815)
Sub-Saharan Korea Rep. (1960)
Ghana (1960) Malaysia (1957)
Kenya (1969) Myanmar (1948)
Mozambique (1975) Philippines (1948)
South Africa (1946) Thailand (1929)
Zambia (1969)
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
This table presents the summary statistics for the 53 countries of our dataset.
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Delay in Primary Schooling 110.6 40.10 1 164
Delay in Compulsory Schooling 162.2 57.21 1 224
Initial Income 7.010 0.482 6.116 8.583
Initial Exec. Cons. 0.370 0.399 0.000 1.000
Political Instability 0.278 0.385 0.000 2.375
BFLZ Gini Index 0.491 0.110 0.276 0.794
Land Gini 0.636 0.144 0.307 0.863
Arable Land 6.934 1.573 3.367 11.27
Total Population 7.343 1.728 4.143 12.01
Total Land 10.60 1.580 7.784 13.77
Independence 84.00 73.10 0.000 199.0
Tropics 0.376 0.417 0.000 1.000
Ethnic Frac. 0.373 0.247 0.012 0.859
British Colony 0.302 0.463 0.000 1.000
French Colony 0.057 0.233 0.000 1.000
Span./Port Colony 0.302 0.463 0.000 1.000
Other Colonies 0.113 0.320 0.000 1.000
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Table 3: Primary Schooling Penetration Rate Failure
This table lists the countries that fail to attain a given penetration rate in primary schooling enrollment for
various penetration rates.
40% 45% 50% 55% 60% 65% 70%
Morocco India Egypt Egypt Egypt China Algeria
Pakistan Morocco India Guatemala Ghana Colombia China
Pakistan Morocco India Guatemala Egypt Colombia
Mozambique Iraq Honduras Ghana Costa Rica
Pakistan Morocco India Guatemala Egypt
Mozambique Iran Honduras El Salvador
Myanmar Iraq India Ghana
Nicaragua Morocco Iran Greece
Pakistan Mozambique Iraq Guatemala
















Table 4: Hazard Model for the Delay in Primary Schooling
The table presents BMA results for the Cox-PH duration model. The posterior inclusion probability (PIP) of a variable is the sum of the
posterior probabilities models that include that variable. The posterior mean (PM) is the average of the partial likelihood coefficient estimates
(COEF) of individual models weighted by posterior probability. The posterior standard error (PSE) is the BMA estimate for the standard
error (SE) taking model uncertainty into account. All reported standard errors refer to heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. ***,
**, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Model Averaging Posterior Mode Largest
PIP PM PSE COEF SE COEF SE
Land gini 99.0 -6.5499*** 2.0889 -6.8442*** 1.9240 -6.4240*** 2.0255
Initial Income 98.0 1.3818*** 0.5067 1.4561*** 0.3901 1.2741** 0.5884
Arable Land 90.7 -0.3914** 0.1917 -0.4225*** 0.1255 -0.3850* 0.2222
Total Land 8.6 -0.0084 0.0511 - - -0.0223 0.1488
Total Population 11.5 -0.0213 0.1038 - - -0.0616 0.2005
British Colony 96.2 2.1990** 0.8716 2.3066*** 0.6135 2.3614* 1.2712
Span./Port. Colony 8.2 -0.0410 0.2292 - - -0.4015 0.7610
French Colony 16.0 0.2377 0.7276 - - 1.5705 1.5621
Other Colonies 100.0 2.6569*** 0.7838 2.6228*** 0.6439 3.1831*** 1.0227
Independence 100.0 -0.0234*** 0.0054 -0.0235*** 0.0046 -0.0279*** 0.0080
Political Instability 100.0 -2.3603*** 0.8898 -2.3131*** 0.7411 -2.3003** 1.0115
Initial Exec. Cons. 12.9 0.1204 0.4456 - - 0.7721 0.7475
Tropics 12.5 -0.0642 0.2512 - - 0.1920 0.9229
Ethnic Frac. 39.0 -0.5629 0.8587 - - -1.1971 0.9417
BFLZ Gini Index 10.1 0.1696 0.7714 - - 2.1577 2.1915
Wald Statistic 42.80 52.42
Posterior Model Probability 0.165 0.000
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Table 5: Hazard Model for the Delay in Compulsory Schooling
The table presents BMA results for the Cox-PH duration model. The posterior inclusion probability (PIP) of a variable is the sum of the
posterior probabilities models that include that variable. The posterior mean (PM) is the average of the partial likelihood coefficient estimates
(COEF) of individual models weighted by posterior probability. The posterior standard error (PSE) is the BMA estimate for the standard
error (SE) taking model uncertainty into account. All reported standard errors refer to heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. ***,
**, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Model Averaging Posterior Mode Largest
PIP PM PSE COEF SE COEF SE
Land gini 90.6 -4.6400** 2.2970 -5.1309*** 1.2034 -4.5010*** 1.3918
Initial Income 91.0 1.1788** 0.5866 1.4142*** 0.3954 1.2249** 0.5876
Arable Land 7.8 0.0095 0.0550 - - 0.0393 0.2424
Total Land 93.3 0.3333** 0.1511 0.4163*** 0.1080 0.3895*** 0.1126
Total Population 5.7 -0.0004 0.0410 - - -0.0600 0.2487
British Colony 9.5 0.0533 0.2462 - - 0.3713 0.9218
Span./Port. Colony 8.2 -0.0324 0.1758 - - -0.1884 0.6721
French Colony 13.4 -0.1261 0.4427 - - 0.3561 1.2753
Other Colonies 45.8 0.6427 0.8455 1.4122** 0.6902 1.7615* 1.0220
Independence 100.0 -0.0115*** 0.0036 -0.0123*** 0.0028 -0.0147 *** 0.0056
Political Instability 100.0 -2.8292*** 1.0404 -3.3992*** 0.9948 -3.5118*** 1.3231
Initial Exec. Cons. 7.9 0.0387 0.2125 - - 0.2396 0.7668
Tropics 10.8 -0.0548 0.2437 - - -0.1263 0.5372
Ethnic Frac. 95.0 -2.4218** 1.0129 -2.4756*** 0.6493 -2.4497*** 0.8252
BFLZ Gini Index 56.4 2.1925 2.3665 4.2561*** 1.5141 4.3827** 1.7977
Wald Statistic 53.58 71.44
Posterior Model Probability 0.104 0.000
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Table 6: Alternative Model Spaces
This model averaging analysis using different model spaces for Cox-PH duration model using both Delay in Primary Schooling and Delay in
Compulsory Schooling. Model Space I always keeps in Land gini in the model and Model Space II always keeps all the variables suggested
by GMV: Land Gini, Total Land, Arable Land, Initial Income, and Total Population.
Delay in Primary Schooling Delay in Compulsory Schooling
Model Space I Model Space II Model Space I Model Space II
PIP PM PSE PIP PM PSE PIP PM PSE PIP PM PSE
Land gini - -6.6131*** 1.9969 - -6.6858*** 1.9849 - -5.1224*** 1.8314 - -5.0562*** 1.9364
Initial Income 97.9 1.3842*** 0.5073 - 1.4385*** 0.5280 94.3 1.2460** 0.5492 - 1.2132** 0.5707
Arable Land 91.6 -0.3952** 0.1887 - -0.4085* 0.2116 7.7 0.0083 0.0523 - 0.1471 0.2253
Total Land 8.7 -0.0085 0.0513 - -0.0662 0.1383 92.6 0.3351** 0.1540 - 0.3383** 0.1336
Total Population 11.6 -0.0215 0.1043 - 0.0125 0.2050 6.2 -0.0005 0.0431 - -0.0988 0.2238
British Colony 96.2 2.2068** 0.8701 95.4 2.2915** 0.9554 8.8 0.0431 0.2192 10.3 0.0383 0.2336
Span./Port. Colony 8.3 -0.0414 0.2303 12.2 -0.0668 0.2952 7.3 -0.0232 0.1517 9.0 -0.0205 0.1934
French Colony 16.2 0.2400 0.7308 20.3 0.3326 0.8674 14.8 -0.1392 0.4632 16.9 -0.1471 0.4821
Other Colonies 100.0 2.6555*** 0.7846 100.0 2.6946*** 0.8202 40.9 0.5443 0.7943 47.9 0.6704 0.8516
Independence 100.0 -0.0234*** 0.0053 100.0 -0.0242*** 0.0057 100.0 -0.0116*** 0.0036 100.0 -0.0120*** 0.0034
Political Instability 100.0 -2.3628*** 0.8899 100.0 -2.3834*** 0.9089 100.0 -2.7748*** 1.0332 100.0 -2.9696*** 1.1004
Initial Exec. Cons. 13.1 0.1215 0.4476 16.8 0.1537 0.4929 8.0 0.0371 0.2076 9.9 0.0355 0.2207
Tropics 12.6 -0.0648 0.2523 14.4 -0.0704 0.2666 11.9 -0.0605 0.2554 8.6 -0.0128 0.1686
Ethnic Frac. 38.4 -0.5518 0.8519 32.5 -0.4578 0.8129 94.5 -2.3795** 1.0205 99.1 -2.5756*** 0.8926
BFLZ Gini Index 10.2 0.1713 0.7749 11.1 0.1673 0.7809 59.6 2.3489 2.3903 54.5 2.0696 2.3265
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Table A1: Data Appendix
Variable Description
Delay in Schooling Following the methodology of Comin and Hobijn (2004), we construct historical data for primary
schooling enrollments, measured as the number of students in primary school as a fraction of
population between 5-14. First, we verify the dataset of Comin and Hobijn (2004), which is
limited to 23 industrialized countries and then expand it to 53 countries. Using this new dataset
we create the delay in schooling variable, which is the time it takes for each country to first reach
a penetration rate in primary schooling enrollment, minus the time it took the first country to
pass that penetration rate. Source: Mitchell (1998) for the population data; Banks (1999) for the
number of students.
Delays in compulsory schooling It is the time it takes for each country to introduce compulsory schooling legislation comparing to
the first country that introduced such legislation. Source: Various.
Initial Income Log of GDP per capita, where for the colonies we use the independence date or earliest available,
and for the non-colonies the average of earliest possible until 1831 (penetration rate of 50%).
Source: Maddison (2009).
Initial Executive Constraints Institutional variable with the lowest value 0 indicating unlimited executive authority and 1
executive parity or subordination. For the colonies we use the independence date or earliest
available, and for the non-colonies the average of earliest possible until 1831 (penetration rate of
50%). Source: Polity IV, http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm
BFLZ Gini Index BFLZ Gini Index is based on a large number of observations of within country inequality spanning
from 1820-1995. For non-colonies we use earliest available and for colonies we use the Independence
date and if not available we use the earliest available after Independence. In particular, the Gini
Index is based on direct income Gini estimates; estimates of the net household or expenditure
Ginis; Ginis based on income shares; Williamson index, which is the ratio between GDP per capita
and real wages of unskilled laborers; and height inequality data. Source: Van Zanden, Baten,




Land Gini The gini coefficient of the size distribution of land. For all countries we use the earliest observation
available. We use data over the period 1880-1999. Source: Frankema (2009).
Arable Land Log of arable land (absolute) in hectares, in 1700. Source: Ramankutty and Foley (1999)
Total Land Log of total land in hectares, in 1700. Source: Ramankutty and Foley (1999)
Total Population Log of total population in 1700. Maddison (2009).
Independence Independence The time it takes for each country to declare independence relative to the United
States who declared independence in 1776. Source: CIA Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/
library/publications/the-world-factbook/
Tropics Percentage of land area classified as tropical and subtropical via the Koeppen-Geiger system.
Source: CID at Harvard, http://www.cid.harvard.edu/ciddata/ciddata.html
Ethnic Fractionalization Variable which combines racial and linguistic characteristics. Source: Alesina, Devleeschauwer,
Easterly, Kurlat, and Wacziarg (2003).
Colonial Dummies Coded zero or one. One indicates that country was colonized by Britain, France, Spain or Portugal.
Source: CIA Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/
Political Instability Political Instability is measured as the average of the first differences (in absolute values) of the
Polity2 variable from Polity IV. The Polity2 variable is a measure of the degree of democracy in a
country with a score of +10 representing most democratic and -10 signifying most autocratic.
The averages of the first differences are calculated as follows: for colonies we average values
of the (absolute) year-to-year changes in the Polity2 variable from the year of independence to
the year the colony achieves the schooling penetration rate, while for non-colonies, we take the
corresponding average values from the earliest available observation until the year the country
achieves the schooling penetration rate. Source: Polity IV, http://www.systemicpeace.org/
polity/polity4.htm
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Figure A1: BMA Posterior Distributions for θ - Delay in Primary Schooling





































































































































































































Figure A2: BMA Posterior Distributions for θ - Delay in Compulsory Schooling
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Figure A4: Cumulative Posterior Model Probabilities for Delay in Compulsory Schooling for
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